

Ignorance in context

The interaction of modified numerals and QUDs

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Main contribution

A well-known contrast: (Geurts and Nouwen, 2007)

- (1) I saw **at most** seven of the coins. \rightsquigarrow *not sure how many*.
- (2) I saw **less than** eight of the coins. $\not\rightsquigarrow$ *not sure how many*.

Empirical & methodological puzzle:

- ▶ (1,2) contrast in **validity judgment** task; (Geurts et al.)
- ▶ but not in **truth judgment** task. (Coppock et al.)

Coppock et al.'s proposal:

- ▶ “at most”/“less than” are *semantically distinct*;
- ▶ this yields a difference in *ignorance implicature*;
- ▶ to which truth judgements are *insensitive*.

Problems (a.o.):

- ▶ other implicatures *are* detected by truth judgement;
- ▶ no other diagnostic is given for semantic difference.

We present **new evidence** for a *different* explanation:

- (i) what matters is the **question under discussion** (QUD);
- (ii) and how participants **know/guess** what it is.

Assumptions & crucial prediction

Ignorance inferences derive in two steps:

1. *What's the context like; was a **precise answer** desired?*
2. *If so, then why didn't the speaker give one?*

Step 1 relies on an **explicit QUD** or **intonation**.

Without those, **participants must guess** based on:


- ▶ **typical use:** (cf. Cummins & Katsos)
“at most” \rightsquigarrow precise context;
“less than” \rightsquigarrow imprecise context;
- ▶ **experimental task:**
truth judgment \rightsquigarrow imprecise context;
validity judgment \rightsquigarrow can be either.

This can explain the above puzzle.

Prediction: in a (textual) validity judgment task:

- ▶ if we present **QUDs of varying explicitness**,
- ▶ then the contrast (1,2) will appear & disappear.

Results of experiment I



Mixed-effects ordinal probit reg. on **judgments** (ref. **POLAR+COMP**):

- ▶ significant effects for **WHAT** ($p = .003$), **HOWMANY** ($p = .0004$);
- ▶ *only* within **HOWMANY**, significant effect for SUP ($p = .016$).

Experiment design

Two experiments with the same design, three screens per stimulus:

1. **question** (QUD);
2. **answer**, shown word-by-word by **self-paced reading**;
3. **inference** with **validity judgment** (5-point Likert scale).

The judge asks: "What did you see under the bed?"
The witness responds:

--- most ---

Based on this, the judge concludes:

"The witness doesn't know exactly how many of the coins she saw under the bed."

How justified is the judge in drawing that conclusion?

(not justified at all) 1 2 3 4 5 (strongly justified)

- ▶ 3 question types \times 2 answer types = **6 conditions**;
- ▶ latin square design, 108 stimuli (36 items + 72 fillers);
- ▶ 35 and 51 participants, respectively (ling. undergrads).

QUD types experiment I:

- ▶ **POLAR:** Did you *V Mod* ten of the *N PP*?
($V \in \{\text{see, hear, find}\}$, *Mod* same as in answer)
- ▶ **WHAT:** What did you *V PP*?
- ▶ **HOWMANY:** How many of the *N* did you *V PP*?


QUD types experiment II:

- ▶ **APPROX:** Approximately how many [...]?
- ▶ **EXACT:** Exactly how many [...]?
- ▶ **DISJUNCT:** Did you *V* eight, nine, ten or eleven [...]?

Answer types (same in both experiments):

- ▶ **SUP:** I *V* at most ten of the *Ns PP*.
- ▶ **COMP:** I *V* less than ten of the *Ns PP*.

Results of experiment II



Mixed-effects ordinal probit reg. on **judgments** (ref. **APPROX+COMP**):

- ▶ significant effects for **EXACT** ($p = .0003$), **DISJUNCT** ($p = .007$);
- ▶ no significant effects for SUP anywhere.

Generalizations/discussion: Validity (scale 1-5)

Weak ignorance in **POLAR**, **APPROX**:

- ▶ Explanation: these do not ask for a precise answer.

Strong ignorance in **WHAT**, **EXACT**, **DISJUNCT**;

- ▶ Explanation: these ask for a precise answer.

Contrast SUP/COMP only in **HOWMANY**:

- ▶ Explanation: this is underspecified for precision...
- ▶ hence the *typical use* of “at most”/“less than” kicks in.

Generalizations/discussion: Reading times

Experiment I: slower reading \sim stronger ignorance.

This may be due to:

- (i) **processing cost** of ignorance inference; or
- (ii) **subvocalization** with *contrastive topic* on modifier.

Experiment II: no effect, probably due to *priming*:

- ▶ fillers tested only ignorance inferences (unlike in exp. 1);
- ▶ *given* priming, slower reading \sim stronger judgments!

Broader implications

- ▶ Implicatures aren't *flimsy*; they are *context-dependent*;
- ▶ with underspecified context, typical usage kicks in;
- ▶ experimenters, control for QUD and/or intonation!