## A unifying understanding of rise-fall-rise, topics and non-at-issue meaning

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GLOW: Compositionality at the Interfaces Leiden, March 2017

#### Outline

#### 1. Aims of this talk

2. Intonational Compliance Marking (Westera 2017)

3. Application to rise-fall-rise

4. Conclusion

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#### Main aims:

- to identify the core meaning of RFR;
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- to explain how it accounts for the above range of uses.

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- ▶ [some empirical inadequacies].

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  - e.g., Quality suspension implies speaker bias (Gunlogson, 2008);
- the essence of this proposal aligns with much previous work (e.g., Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg 1990).
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Remark: there are two variants:

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(Gussenhoven 1983, 2002: delay conveys extra significance.)

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like boundary tones (H%/L%), also trailing tones (L\*H, H\*L) convey (non-)compliance with the maxims.

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- Is compliance marked for the entire utterance or only some part?

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Roughly:

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- $Q_0$  and  $Q_i$  can be identical.

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## 3.1. Core prediction regarding RFR

Prediction 1:

An utterance with RFR addresses, on top of the main  $\operatorname{QuD} \mathcal{Q}_0$ , a secondary  $\operatorname{QuD} \mathcal{Q}_1$  (due to which the accented word is important).

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General recipe for understanding any particular use of RFR:

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- ► The ICM theory generates many predictions even without a precise understanding of the QUDs.

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**Prediction 2:** in utterances that end with L%, prefinal RFR marks material that conveys a secondary intent (non-at-issue meaning).

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A similar analysis is available for (6):

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#### **Prediction 3:**

Pre-final RFR can mark the topic of the utterance.

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Jackendoff (1972) claims that (14) is the exact mirror image:

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Indeed (Wagner 2012; Meyer, Fedorenko & Gibson 2011):

- (15) A: Did John insult Mary?
  - a. B: No! Mary, insulted John.

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But the contributions are metalinguistic

(and the shift in main  $\operatorname{QuD}$  this imposes is annoying).

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#### Outline

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- 2. Intonational Compliance Marking (Westera 2017)
- 3. Application to rise-fall-rise
- 4. Conclusion

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**Prediction 6:** On utterances with a single explicated intent, RFR commits the speaker to the truth of that intent (Quality).

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