‘Attention, I’m violating a maxim!’
A unifying account of the final rise.

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Outline

1. The phenomenon
   Examples and existing accounts

2. Proposal
   A clash between aspects of cooperativity

3. Illustration
   Making sense of the examples

4. Three general remarks
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4. Three general remarks
1.1. Uncertainty, guessing, surprise

(1) A: John has to pick up his sister.
   B: John has a sister

Existing approaches:
\( \phi \) puts commitment to \( \phi \) on addressee. (Gunlogson, 2003)
\( \phi \) conveys 'possibly not \( \phi \)' (Truckenbrodt, 2006)
\( \phi \) conveys 'possibly \( \phi \)' ('might \( \phi \)') (Šafářová, 2007) yields a second-person speech-act (Trinh & Crníč, 2011)

Maxim of Quality: Say only that which you think is true.
1.1. Uncertainty, guessing, surprise

(1) A: John has to pick up his sister.
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(2) A: Guess which colours John likes!
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(3) A: [comes in with an umbrella] B: It’s raining
1.1. Uncertainty, guessing, surprise

(1) A: John has to pick up his sister.
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- yields a second-person speech-act (Trinh & Crnič, 2011)
1.2. Continuation, lists

(4) A: Who was at the party?
   B: Mary ↗, Bob ↗, and Sue.
1.2. Continuation, lists


(4) A: Who was at the party?
   B: Mary, Bob, and Sue.

(5) A: What did you do today?
   B: I sat in on a history class. I learned about housing prices.
      And I watched a cool documentary.
1.3. Partial answerhood, uncertain relevance
Ward & Hirschberg (1985); Constant (2012); Wagner et al (this morning)

(6) A: Of John, Mary and Bob, who came to the party?
  B: John was there ↗
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(7) A: Was John at the party? – B: It was raining


Existing approaches:
/uni25B8 uncertainty regarding a scale (Ward & Hirschberg, 1985)
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Maxim of Relation:
/uni25B8 You must know the QUD.
/uni25B8 You must know that all alternative answers are false.
/uni25B8 You must know that all alternative answers are true.
No way!
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4. Three general remarks
2.1. One rise to rule them all?

1. Uncertainty, guessing, surprise
2. Continuation, lists
3. Partial answerhood, uncertain relevance
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What do these have in common?

- unfinishedness; 

(Bolinger, 1982)
2.1. One rise to rule them all?

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What do these have in common?

- *unfinishedness*; (Bolinger, 1982)
- *open-endedness*; (Hobbs, 1990)
- ...

My proposal

The final rise conveys non-cooperativity `a la Grice (1975).

\[\text{In particular, a clash between aspects of cooperativity.}\]

This is affected by the degree of non-cooperativity. (e.g., Gussenhoven, 2004; Banziger & Scherer, 2005)
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- probably nothing.  
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2.1. One rise to rule them all?

1. Uncertainty, guessing, surprise \textit{high rise}
2. Continuation, lists \textit{low rise}
3. Partial answerhood, uncertain relevance \textit{low rise}

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The final rise conveys \textit{non-cooperativity} à la Grice (1975).

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- The steepness marks general \textit{emotional activation}.
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The final rise conveys *non-cooperativity* à la Grice (1975).

- In particular, a *clash* between aspects of cooperativity.

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Existing approaches:
- ‘φ ↦’ puts commitment to φ on addressee. (Gunlogson, 2003)
- ‘φ ↞’ conveys ‘possibly not φ’ (Truckenbrodt, 2006)
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- yields a second-person speech-act (Trinh & Crnič, 2011)
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Maxim of Quantity: Give all the directly relevant information you hold true.
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Ward & Hirschberg (1985); Constant (2012); Wagner et al (this morning)

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(8) A: Does your friend live far away? − B: In Philadelphia ↗

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- You must know that all alternative answers are true.  No way!
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4.1. How to know which reading is intended?

Of course ‘non-cooperativity’ is very unspecific.
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- Speakers can disambiguate with:
  - intonation (RFR?);

On the other hand:

The different readings are so different...

...that often minimal contextual knowledge will suffice.

Work in progress:

Sentence-internal rises do the same, but w.r.t. sentence-internal questions.
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- ...that often minimal *contextual knowledge* will suffice.

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- *Sentence-internal* rises do the same, but w.r.t. *sentence-internal* questions.
4.2. Is the theory refutable?

A potential worry:
- Given the open-endedness of the set of maxims...
4.2. Is the theory refutable?

A potential worry:

- Given the open-endedness of the set of maxims...
- and their context-dependence...

Well, yes!

While it doesn't constrain the number of different readings; it does very rigidly constrain the kinds of readings.

The account is falsified (or its generality challenged) if:

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Compared to ‘open-endedness’ or ‘unfinishedness’:

- All aspects of cooperativity must be independently motivated.
- Many aspects of cooperativity have already been studied.
- (Non-)cooperativity comes with various tools:
  - Griceans: A maxim violation.
  - Relevance theorists: Non-optimal relevance.
  - Discourse tree-huggers: Incongruence.
  - Game-theoreticians/Bayesians: Non-maximal expected utility.

These can now be applied to intonational meaning.

Secondary advantage: The rise enables us to probe into the notion of cooperativity; and to reverse-engineer certain aspects of it (e.g., Relation).
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Thank you!

Thanks to the SemDial reviewers, to A. Ettinger, J. Tyler, M. Križ, F. Roelofsen, J. Groenendijk, and the audience of CISI for valuable comments. Thanks to the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for financial support.
Motivating the Maxim of Relation: exhaustivity

(9) Of John, Bill and Mary, who came to the party?
   - John came.  \(\sim\) Mary and Bill didn’t. (exhaustivity)
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“[the epistemic] step does not follow from Gricean maxims and logic alone.” - Chierchia, et al. (2008)
Existing ‘Gricean’ approaches

Most existing work (since Mill, 1867):

1. The speaker is competent as to whether Mary came (Context)
2. She lacks the belief that Mary came (Quantity)
3. She believes that Mary didn’t come

Geurts, 2011: ‘One of the main virtues of [this approach] is that it distinguishes between weak and strong implicatures, and connects them via the Competence Assumption.’

(10) (Uttered when speaker is known not to be competent)

Bonnie stole some of the pears.

Of course, this is not very surprising: Speaker’s competence is her ability to give an explanation. Hence no explanation if the context negates competence.

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(speaker says ‘*John*’ because she doesn’t consider ‘*Mary*’ possible.)
I assume intonational meaning is *non-at-issue content*.
Composing non-at-issue content

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Compositional 3D semantics: (Gutzmann, 2013)

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Derivation: that damn John!
That damn John was at the party
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That damn John was at the party

\[
\lambda x.x \quad \lambda x.\text{dislike}(s, x) \quad j
\]

\[
\text{damn} \quad \text{John}
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Derivation: that damn John!

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\[ j \]

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Satisfied non-at-issue content:

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Finally, I assume:

- $I$ fetches an *issue* from the context (for now, $\mathcal{Q}$).
- In the second dimension:
  - $\downarrow \colon \lambda p_{stt} \cdot \smiley(I, p)$; and
  - $\uparrow \colon \lambda p_{stt} \cdot \frown(I, p)$
Derivation: The final rise

[That damn John was at the party]↑

Satisfied non-at-issue content:
dislike(s, j)

damn

λx. dislike(s, x)

λx. party(x)

was at the party

John

λx. party(x)

λx. party(x)

j

j

j

j

j

λx. x

party(j)

party(j)

λx. party(x)
Derivation: The final rise

[That damn John was at the party]↑

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\lambda p.p \\
\lambda p.(\text{party}(j), p) \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\lambda x.x \\
\lambda x.\text{dislike}(s, x) \\
\end{array}
\]

was at the party
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[That damn John was at the party]↑

Satisfied non-at-issue content:

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\text{dislike}(s, j)
\]

\[
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\]
Derivation: The final rise

[That damn John was at the party]  

Satisfied non-at-issue content:

\[ \text{dislike}(s, j) \]
Derivation: The final rise

[That damn John was at the party]

Satisfied non-at-issue content:

\( \text{dislike}(s, j) \)
Derivation: The final rise

[That damn John was at the party] ↗

Satisfied non-at-issue content:

\[ \text{dislike}(s, j) \]
\[ \frown(Q, \text{party}(j)) \]
References (i)

- Geurts (2010). Quantity implicatures.
- Gussenhoven (2004). ***
References (ii)